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Legal reasoning, antitrust policy and 
the social “ science” of economics
BY JOHN J. FLYNN*
In tro d u ctio n
There is an area som e eight to ten miles o f f  Astoria, Oregon, 
called “ The B a r / ’ where the fresh water o f  the Columbia River 
meets the salt water o f  the Pacific Ocean. It is a place o f  
turbulent, shifting currents and choppy waters where moving 
sand bars trap even the most experienced sailors. Like sailing 
“ The B ar,”  crossing intellectual disciplines is often not the 
simple blend o f  one glass o f  water with another, but the turbid 
mixture o f  one substance and force with another. In the clash o f  
law with the “ C hicago” or Neo-Classical School o f  Econom ics 
there is turbulence because the assumptions (moral and factual) 
and the m ethodology or reasoning process o f  the one do not 
conform  with those o f  the other. Like the mindless mixing o f  salt 
water and fresh, the unthinking blend o f  law and social sciences 
can contam inate the rhetoric and m ethodology o f  both disci-
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plines, and the resulting turbulence can obscure rather than 
advance our understanding o f  reality and search for the truth.
It will be my thesis that neoclassical thought is incom patible 
with the reality facing antitrust, the substantive goals o f  antitrust 
policy, and the demands o f  legal reasoning and the institutional 
constraints placcd upon it. While law is dependent upon a 
number o f  disciplines (including econom ics) for insights and for 
understanding the reality that the rules are intended to regulate, 
the current attempt to make one school o f  econom ic thought the 
exclusive means for determining the relevance, meaning and 
application o f  both the rules and the facts o f  legal disputes is a 
serious mistake.
There is a deeper statement underlying my criticism. It is an 
epistem ological statement rejecting the claim that the only know- 
able source o f  standards for legal decision making is one that can 
be objectively verified by testing pursuant to a m odel that 
purports to quantify reality objectively— whether it be a political, 
econom ic, social, legal or other fixed model o f  the is to determine 
the ought. Scientific models— from  N ew ton’s laws o f  gravity to 
phrenology to econom ic models— are, like all broad aesthetic 
statements, premised upon assumptions; moral or ought assump­
tions that define what will and what will not be permitted to be 
“ reality” for purposes o f  the analysis and what will and what will 
not be permitted to be the values given weight in the analysis. An  
empirical investigation unaware o f  its own assumptions and 
values is neither empirical nor an investigation. It is an exercise in 
confirm ing one’s fixed and unchallengeable ideological beliefs.
The criticism I make and the epistem ological conclusion I 
reach are the same as that Plato made and rcached in The 
A llegory  o f  the C ave :
[T]he prison house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the 
sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey 
upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world 
according to my poor belief. . . . [M]y opinion is that in the world 
of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only 
with an effort; and when seen, is a!so inferred to be the universal 
author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the 
lord o f light in this visible world, and the immediate source o f reason
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and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he
who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his
eye fixed.
Neoclassical analysis o f  the reality confronted by antitrust dis­
putes misstates the idea o f  the good to be pursued (the normative 
purposes o f ihe law) and wanders about in a cave o f  a seeming 
reality o f  its own construct, chasing misleading shadows gener­
ated by the false sun (normative assumptions) o f  its own creation.
Part o f  the problem is caused by the tendency o f  the legal 
process to resist a liberation o f  its thinking from reified rules and 
rigid concepts applied mechanically without regard for ihe values 
and history that underly the law', and that change reality and 
generate new insights into old problems. Lawyers and judges 
develop vested interests characterized by minds fixed in known  
rules ordering a known reality. It is easier and less threatening to  
apply the known than to reexamine assumptions and the com fort­
able reality we arrogantly think we know . The connotation and 
denotation o f  concepts underlying the language o f law' are, 
however, obliterated by the mindless mechanical application o f  
rules to an unseen but changing reality. Because o f  this, law and 
legal analysis are for the intellectually arrogant; persons con­
vinced that only they and their reified view's possess truth, beauty 
and justice. Within the sun and the shadows o f  the artificial cave 
o f  their creation, they are intolerant o f  insights behind their 
particular sun. Legal disputes and their involvement with the is in 
light o f  the ought should, however, constantly remind us o f  what 
we are about while illuminating what we are becoming in the 
context o f  what we have been.
The proponents o f  neoclassical thought view econom ics as a 
“ science” in the 19th-century meaning o f  that term; a science 
producing unyielding and eternal truths and fixed assumptions 
for measuring reality.1 They assume that models can produce 
quantifiable data for reduction to  “ truth” through the “ neutral”
1 A similar movemenL in political science, based on the advocacy 
of Leo Strauss, has been made the basis of the cori.servative political 
appeal to “original intent." It is premised on the beiief thai there are
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tools o f  language, mathematics, statistics and simplistic deductive 
log ic .1 For som e econom ists and other social scientists, political 
science, econom ics, psychology, and sociology became hard “ sci­
ences”  through the seemingly objective m ethodology o f  mathe-
eternal and unchanging “truths” that can be discovered from the care­
ful reading of selected original documents by great thinkers divorced 
from the history and circumstances in which they wrote. As in the fun­
damentalist religious movement, behaviorism and relativism are rejected 
in the name o f pursuing eternal truths from original texts and divorced 
from their historical, economic, psychological or sociological back* 
ground. Despite modern insights in language theory, words and the con­
cepts they generate are treated as fixed and immutable. It is “ a 
philosophical conservatism of a special kind,” a philosophy based on 
faith that is no longer philosophy. See Wood, The Fundamentalists and 
the Constitution, N.Y. R e v ie w  o f  Books 33 (Feb. IS, 1988).
2 See M. F k je d m a n , The Methodology o f  Positive Economics, in 
E s s a y s  in  P o s h  jv e  E c o n o m ic s  3 (1 9 6 6 ) ; R . B o r k ,  T h e  A n t i t r u s t  P a r a ­
d o x  120 (1 9 7 8 ) . The model's assumptions determine what will be 
allowed to be the relevant facts and values for purposes of the analysis 
of ihe dispute. Thus, the “ facts” of the dispute and the values that 
guide the decision making always conform to the model’s assumptions, 
because values and facts not in conformity with the assumptions of the 
model are excluded from consideration in the process o f decision mak­
ing. Professor Mason, in criticizing such an antiempirical approach, has 
observed: “Deception occurs because the pure theories o f this frame­
work are consistently misapplied in the interpretation o f concrete real­
ity. . . , [Accordingly, so-called empiricists have sought to verify their 
own hypotheses and to demolish contrary views by selection and manip­
ulation of data that cannot accomplish either purpose. Such perform­
ances have been characterized as ‘blatantly ^scientific’ . . . and an 
‘abandonment of empirical science for a numerology similar to astrol­
ogy.’ ” Mason, Some Negative Thoughts on Friedman's Positive Eco­
nomics, 3 J. P o s t- K k v n e s ia n  E c o n .  2 3 5 , 244 (1 9 8 0 -8 1 ) .
Thus, if the only concern of antitrust policy is with allocative effi­
ciency, only that reality concerning price and output will be “ facts” for 
purpose of the analysis. In addition, those “ facts” permitted to be 
“ facts” will be interpreted in light of the assumptions o f the model. For 
an example of such a rigid and antiempirical form of reasoning, see 
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986). See also Flynn, An Antitrust Allegory, 38 H a s t i n g s  L.I. 517
(1987).
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m atics, abandoning “ so ft” hum anism .1 Similar afflictions stulti­
fied American law a century ago with the rise o f  legal positivism  
and the belief that law could be reduced to fixed rules
1 It has been observed: “ No small part o f the attraction o f an 
excessive reliance upon economic theorizing is the assertion by some 
that economics is a science capable o f producing ‘‘truth’' like the sup­
posed truths o f physics, chemistry or astronomy. There is the paradox 
that just as science was coming to the realization that its models did not 
necessarily produce eternal and unchanging truths, and indeed were 
incapable o f doing so, the discipline of economics was becoming cap­
tured by an outmoded concept o f the nature of scientific knowledge. 
For descriptions of the evolution in the nature of scientific reasoning, 
see J. C o n a n t ,  M o d e r n  S c ie n c e  a n d  M olm -kn  M a n  (1953); T ,  K u h n ,  T h e  
S t r u c t u r e  o f  S c i e n t i f i c  R e v o lu t i o n s  (2d ed. 1970); A. W h i t e h e a d ,  
M o d e s  o f  T h o u g h t  (1958); A. W h i t  e h  k a d ,  T h e  F u n c t i o n  ok  R e a s o n  
(1957). For a critical analysis of the claim that economics is a “ science,” 
see Rosenberg, I f  Economics Isn't Science, What Is It?, 14 P h i l .  F o r u m  
296, 311 (1983): “ [Wje should view it as a branch of mathematics, one 
devoted to examining the formal properties o f a set o f assumptions 
about the transitivity of abstract relations: axioms that implicitly define 
a technical notion o f “rationality,” just as geometry examines the for­
mal properties o f abstract points and lines.”
Although many lawyers superficially familiar with economics and 
some economists appear to be captured by the neoclassical model, and 
spend their days in manipulating its abstractions without much attention 
paid to its underlying normative assumptions or reality and competing 
theories for evaluating reality, there is a growing recognition that the 
discipline is in intellectual difficulty, if not disrepute, because o f its 
divorce from the reality it claims to deal with. See T .  B a i o l i g h ,  T h e  
lRKKf.fiVANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ECONOMICS (1982); M . HOLLJS & E. Nhl.l , 
R a t i o n a l  E c o n o m ic  M a n  (1975); Kaldor, The Irrelevance o f  Equilib­
rium Economics, in F u r t h e r  E s s a y s  o n  E c o n o m ic  T h e o r y  176 (1978); 
A. K a r m a c k ,  E c o n o m ic s  a n d  t i i e  R e a l  W o r l d  (1983); I. K ik z n e k ,  C o m ­
p e t i t i o n  a n d  E n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  (1973); Flynn, The Misuse o f  Economic 
Analysis in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. U.L, R e v , 335 (1981); Harrison, 
Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits o f  Law and Eco­
nomics, 33 U.C.L.A. L. R e v . 1309(1986); Kuttner, The Poverty o f  Eco­
nomics, T h e  A t l a n t i c  M o n t h l y  74 (Feb. 1985); Leontief, Why 
Economics Needs Input-Output Analysis (interview), C h a l l e n g e ,  
March-April 1985, at 27; Rowe, The Decline o f  Economics and the 
Delusions o f  Models: The Faustian Pact o f  Law and Economics, 72 
G e o .  L.J. 1511 (1984); Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique o f  the Behav­
ioral Foundations o f  Economic Theory, 6 P h i l .  & Pud, A it a i r s  317 
(1977).” Flynn & Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence
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capable o f  m echanical and repetitious application divorced from  
the deeper moral values that law reflects and the evolutions in 
reality and our understanding o f  it. It is an affliction that law has 
been recovering from  for the last 50 years but may have to suffer 
once again, in light o f  the Reagan administration's appointment 
o f econom ic ideologues to the federal courts. If the discipline o f  
econom ics is currently suffering a similar affliction gen era lly / it 
could be one o f  the great intellectual tragedies o f  the 20th 
century. We are aLl in need o f  creative and insightful econom ic 
thinking linked to the moral values underlying our culture and 
capable o f  viewing reality without the rose-colored glasses o f  a 
fixed m odel dictating our understanding o f that reality.
The tragedy may begin to be minimized by changing the 
category o f  econom ics from a “ social science” back to a subdivi­
sion o f  moral philosophy— where Adam Smith began1—and by 
adopting a more hum ble and skeptical attitude with regard to the
o f Vertical Restraints: The Limitations o f Neoclassical Economic Anal­
ysis in the Resolution o f  Antitrust Disputes, 62 N. Y.U. L. R e v . 1125, 
1130 n. 18 (1987) fhereinafter cited as Reasoning],
4 “ Books on technical economics are no longer even superficially 
accessible to fay-people; and young economists overvalue a narrow, and 
occasionally silly, ingenuity of technique. But the main cost is not so 
often noticed. It is that during their conversion to a mathematical way 
of talking the economists adopted a crusading faith, a set of philosophi­
cal doctrines, that makes them prone now to fanaticism and intolerance. 
The faith consists o f  scientism, behaviorism, operationaJism, positive 
economics and other quantifying enthusiasms of the 1930s. In the way 
of crusading faiths, these doctrines have hardened into ceremony, and 
now support many nuns, bishops, and cathedrals.” D. M c C l o s k e y ,  T h e  
R h e t o r i c  o f  E c o n o m ic s  4 (1985).
s Adam Smith, a professor of moral philosophy, viewed economic 
analysis as concerned with only one aspect of the activity of individuals 
in society and believed [hat controls were required O ver ( h e  self- 
regarding activities o f  individuals. Among the controls over self-interest 
that Smith recognized as necessary were rules of justice and morality, 
which must be known and observed by members of the social group. See 
Skinner, Introduction to A , Smi i h ,  A n  I n q u i r y  I n t o  th e : N a t l k e  a n d  
C a u s e s  o f  t h e  W h a l t h  o f  N a t io n s  (Mod. Lib. ed. 1970).
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dependability o f  the 19th-century m ethodologies o f  science relied 
upon without abandoning their use altogether. Indeed, one might 
even hope that econom ists, judges and lawyers afflicted by 19th- 
century positivism might begin to  see themselves as engaged in a 
calling requiring them to practice their craft on the higher plane 
o f being an art: the art o f  moral philosophy. The use o f  moral 
philosophy in econom ics should produce insights into the human 
condition through inductive and deductive reasoning about the 
econom y and through an awareness o f  the normative assum p­
tions underlying the analysis and the insights o f  history, political 
science, psychology and sociology. I hope to show all this by a 
brief exam ination o f  the current controversy concerning the so- 
called “ law and econom ics” movement as applied to antitrust 
policy, and to do so in a manner that will leave my head attached  
to my body in roughly the same manner to which 1 have becom e 
accustom ed by the time 1 take my leave o f  this debate.
Substance and form
I have only tw o problems with neoclassical econom ic thought, 
particularly the Chicago School version, as applied in the anti­
trust and econom ic regulatory field: one is its substance, and the 
other is its form —or m ethodology. I shall deal summarily with 
the first problem and devote more attention to the second.
On the substantive side, it is clear that the Congressional goals 
for antitrust policy were and continue to be far broader than the 
narrow and technical concept o f  “ efficiency” dictated by the 
factual assumptions and normative values underlying neoclassical 
price theory. Every competent and objective study o f  the legisla­
tive history o f  the antitrust laws indicates that they were passed  
with a series o f  qualitative political, social and econom ic goals or 
values in mind to guide their im plem entation/ The overall goal is
6 Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 M i c h .  L . R e v . 
213, 249 (1955): “ The legislative histories of the various antitrust laws 
fail to exhibit anything resembling a dominant concern for economic 
efficiency.” See also W. L e tw in ,  L a w  a n d  E c o n o m ic  P o l i c y :  The E v o ­
l u t i o n  o f  t h e  S h e r m a n  A n t i t r u s t  A ct (1966); H. T h o r e l l i ,  T h e  Fed-
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that a “ competitive process,”  not the quantitative concept o f  
“ com petition ,” be the rule o f  trade for big and small. More 
particularly, this has been suggested:
There are four major historical goals of antitrust, and all should 
continue to be respected. These are: (I) dispersion o f economic 
power, (2) freedom and opportunity to compete on the merits, (3) 
satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection o f the competition 
process as market governor.1
e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  P o l i c y — O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  a n  A m e r i c a n  T r a d i t i o n :  
(1954); Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm o f  Industrial 
Organization, 16 U . C .  D a v j s  L. R e v ,  487 (1983); Flynn, The Reagan 
Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent ‘' and the Legislative 
History o f  the Sherman Aci, 33 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l .  259 (1988); Flynn, The 
Use o f  Economic Models, I f  Any, in Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. U.L. 
R e v .  381 (1980); Fox, The Modernization o f  Antitrust: A JMew Equilib­
rium, 66 C o r n e l l  L. R e v .  1140 (1982); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the 
Original and Primary Concern o f  Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpreta­
tion Challenged, 34 H a s t i n g s  L. R t-v . 65 (1982); Limbaugh, Historic 
Origins o f  Antitrust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. R h v .  215 (1953); May, Anti­
trust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional 
and Conceptual Reach o f  State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. Pa. 
L. R e v .  495 (1987); Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic 
Goals o f  Antitrust, 127 U .  Pa. L. R e v .  1076 (1979); Symposium, The 
Economic, Political and Social Goals o f  Antitrust Policy, 125 U. Pa. L. 
R e v .  1182 (1977).
7 Fox, supra note 6, at 1152. The most comprehensive and 
detached study o f the legislative history and climate o f the time was 
done by a Swedish scholar with degrees in law, economics and political 
science, H a n s  B. T h o r e l l i ,  T h e  F e d e r a l  A n t i t r u s t  P o l i c y :  O r g a n i z a ­
t i o n  o f  a n  A m e r i c a n  T r a d i t  i o n  (1955). Professor Thorelli’s book is the 
classic in the field, and a carefu) reading o f it, even with (he tunnel 
vision imposed by a fixed belief in some alternative vision o f what 
should have been, belies the assertion that the Congresses that adopted 
the major antitrust laws had as the sole goal the legislative enshrinement 
of the neoclassical concepts of “ efficiency” or “consumer welfare.” In 
his chapter in T h e  A n t i t r u s t  P a r a d o x  surveying the intentions o f Con­
gress, Judge Bork does not cite Thorelli’* classic study nor any of the 
other major studies of the legislative history of the antitrust laws. Nor is 
it mentioned in the bibliography of primary or secondary sources to the 
book.
Although some works of the historian Richard Hofstadter are cited 
by Bork, HofstadteT’s conclusion about the Congressional goals for 
antitrust policy found in T h e  P a r a n o i d  S t y l e  in  A m e r i c a n  P o l i t i c s  a n d
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The suggestion that these qualitative values are unknowable, 
too  vague, or in mutual conflict and are therefore incapable o f  
providing guidance for the law, and that only the quantitative 
guidance provided by Chicago School econom ic modeling can 
provide knowable standards for decision, is one 1 find unfathom ­
able. It is a quaint return, dressed in the garments o f  scientism, to 
the disastrous legal positivism o f  the last century.1 The legal 
process is constantly confronted with reconciling com peting and 
conflicting moral values underlying its rules in light o f  the specific 
realities o f  individual disputes, role definitions, and the conse­
quences o f  the decision. Indeed, this function is ccntral to the 
legal process, and the art with which it is carried out distinguishes
O t h k r  E s s a y s  199-200 (1965) is n o t  cited: “The goals o f antitrust were1 
of three kinds. The first were economic; the classical model of competi­
tion confirmed the belief that the maximum of economic efficiency 
would be produced by competition, and at least some members o f Con­
gress must have been under the spell of this intellectually elegant model, 
insofar as they were able to formulate their economic intentions in 
abstract terms. The second class of goals was political; the antitrust 
principle was intended to block private accumulations of power and 
protect democratic government. The third was social and moral; Lhc 
competitive process was believed to be a kind o f disciplinary machinery 
for the development of character, and the competitiveness of the 
people—the fundamental stimulus to national morale—was believed to 
need protection.”
8 The claim is often made that the neoclassical model is morally 
neutral and can be mechanically applied without invoking the decision 
maker’s own moral values. By its assumptions, o f course, the model is 
making a choice of what facts and what values ought to be deemed rele­
vant to the analysis. See note 3, supra. For a classic criticism o f such a 
rigid form of logical positivism, see Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional Approach, 55 Cowm. L. R e v ,  809 (1935). As Cohen 
observed elsewhere: “An ethics, like a metaphysics, is no more certain 
and no less dangerous because it is unconsciously held. There are few 
judges, psychologists, or economists today who do not begin a consider­
ation of their typical problems with some formula designed to cause all 
moral ideals to disappear and to produce an issue purified for the proce­
dure o f positive empirical science. But the ideals have generally retired 
to hats f r o m  which later wonders will magically arise.” F . C o h e n ,  T h e  
E t h i c a l  B a s is  o f  L s c s a l  C r i t i c is m  3 (1959). See also Fried, The Laws o f  
Change: The Cunning o f  Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J. 
L e g a l  S t u d i e s  335 (1980). See also D. M c C lo s k e y ,  supra note 4.
722 : The antitrust bulletin
the great jurists from the mediocre. There is a further and 
implicit suggestion by those who maintain that judges should  
simply mechanically implement the dictates o f  neoclassical eco­
nomic theorizing: that an administration not noted for its slavish 
adherence to the laws and policies adopted by Congress should be 
free to redefine unilaterally the goals o f  antitrust policy through  
judicial appointm ents and enforcement policy to satisfy its own  
ideology o f  what the law should be or to  meet the needs o f  its 
political constituency. It is a peculiar form o f  “ law and order” in 
a constitutional democracy premised on a separation o f  legislative 
and executive power and by an administration claiming to be 
com m itted to “ judicial restraint” and “ original intent.”
N o one can read the legislative history o f  the Clayton A ct, for 
exam ple, and reach the conclusion that the purpose o f  that 
statute was solely to control mergers jeopardizing econom ic  
“ efficiency” as that technical concept is defined by neoclassical 
theorizing. The Supreme C ourt’s reading o f  the legislative history 
o f  the statute in Brown Shoe Co. v. U nited States^ and its finding  
that the Act was designed to stop econom ic concentration in its 
incipiency for a variety o f  econom ic, political and social reasons 
is an accurate one, and it is one ignored in the current administra­
tion o f  the statute by the Antitrust Division o f  the Department o f  
Justice and the Federal Trade Com m ission. Indeed, political and  
social concerns with econom ic concentration—concerns consid­
ered well founded by anyone familiar with the histories o f  the 
18th, 19th and 20th centuries— were predominant in the debates 
over the adoption o f  the Clayton and F .T .C . Acts. The claim that 
decision making under the Clayton Act should concern itself only  
with the “ truths” produced by the artificial modeling o f  one  
brand o f  econom ic theorizing is both inconsistent with the legisla­
tive purpose behind the statute and the general responsibility o f  
the courts to effectuate the broader social, political and econom ic
9 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). The legislative history of Section 7 
of the Act, in c lu d in g  amendments, is surveyed in D . M a r t i n ,  M e r g e r s  
a n d  t h e  C l a y t o n  A c t  (1950). See also L. S c h w a r t z ,  J. F l y n n  &  H. 
F i r m ,  F r e e  E n t e r p r i s e  a n u  E c o n o m i c  O r g a n i z a t i o n  205-20 (6lh e d . 
1983), describing the legal, social, political and economic history of the 
statute and amendments to it.
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objectives mandated for the statute by C ongress.10 The emphasis 
upon the m odel's predicted short-term and artificially constructed  
consequences o f  particular conduct deprives antitrust policy o f  its 
moral roots, o f  the capacity to evolve through history and 
experience, o f  new insights into reality11 and o f the awareness o f  
the long-term consequences o f  the decisions made. The same 
critique can be made o f  the exclusive use o f  the neoclassical 
m odel to define the meaning and purpose o f  the other major 
antitrust laws. It is clear that Congress intended and still intends 
that the antitrust laws be administered in light o f  a broad range 
o f social, political and econom ic objectives and not just in the 
narrow and misleading shadows cast in the artificial cave con ­
structed by neoclassical theorizing by the false sun illuminating 
the cave.
From a substantive point o f  view, therefore, I do not think 
there is much to debate, except the meaning and application o f  
these broad values in specific cases or whether these values should  
be abandoned or changed to others by Congress. If the issue is 
whether Congress should change the law, then those sworn to  
enforce the law should be addressing their views to  Congress 
rather than changing the law by adm inistrative nonaction. 
Instead o f  debating that issue, however, I would like to spend 
som e time looking at the m ethodology follow ed by the advocates 
o f  the Chicago School view; a m ethodology that has resulted in 
the repeal o f  effective enforcement o f  the antitrust laws by the 
Reagan administration and by many o f  that adm inistration’s 
appointees to the courts.
10 See note 9, supra.
11 For example, modern insights into the behavior o f managers of 
large firms that now dominate the economy are inconsistent with the 
factual assumptions of neoclassical thought. See M . G r e e n  & J. B e r r y ,  
T h e  C h a l l e n g e  o f  H id d e n  P r o f i t s :  R e d u c in g  C o r p o h a t k  B u r e a u c r a c y  
a n d  W a s t e  (1985); Liebenstein, Microeconomics and X-efficiency the 
Theory: If There Is No Crisis, There Ought to Be, in T h e  C r i s i s  in E c o ­
n o m ic  T h e o r y  97 (D. Bell & I. Kristol eds. 1981); S. M a i t a l ,  M in d s ,  
M a r k e t s  a n d  M o n e y  (1982).
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N eo cla ssica l ec o n o m ic  m eth o d o lo g y  and  
the d em an d s o f  lega l reason in g
The m ethodology relied upon by the Reagan administration  
and Chicago School proponents o f  the application o f  neoclassical 
econom ic theory to antitrust enforcem ent is that o f  a simplistic 
form o f  deductive logic. A  syllogism is established, whose major 
premise forecloses consideration o f  the normative and factual 
issues that legal analysis and the antitrust laws require to be 
investigated by those charged with enforcing and administering 
the law. A minor premise consisting o f  only those “ facts" the 
major premise permits to be “ facts” is then put forward without 
regard to the facts o f the dispute and the circumstances o f  the 
case before the court.12 The only conclusion permitted by the
12 Elsewhere, I have suggested: "Little attention is paid today to a 
profound lesson the legal realists gave us—the significance of the diffi­
cult process by which it is determined what “ facts” are relevant to a dis­
pute, what those “ facts” mean and how those “ facts” operate in the 
application of the rules to the dispute. Legal realists were fact skeptics 
as well as rule skeptics, noting the close interrelationship between deter­
mining the relevance, meaning and application of the rules to the deter­
mination of the relevance, meaning and application of the facts. See J. 
F k a n k ,  C o u r t s  o n  T r i a l  316-25 (1950); Cook, “Facts" and “Statements 
o f  Fact ” , 4 U. Chi. L. Rev 233 (1936); Cohen, Field Theory and Judi­
cial Logic, 59 Y a l e  L.J. 238 (1950); Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and 
Value-Judgments, 10 T e x a s  L. R e v ,  127 (1932). C/., Leff, Some Real­
ism About Nominalism, 60 V a . L. R e v . 451 (1974).
The significance and difficulty of determining what the “ facts” are 
and the interrelationship of that process to the determination of what 
the “rules” are have been noted by modern economists. See Leontief, 
Why Economics Needs Input-Output Analysis (interview), C h a l l e n g e ,  
March-April 1985, at 27: “ [EJconomics is getting Loo far removed from 
observation. Observation must be the origin of the idea. Then there 
must be an interplay between observation and theory. . , . Academic 
economists in our day have generally not been subject to the harsh disci­
pline of systematic fact finding.” See also A. K a m a r c k ,  E c o n o m i c s  a n d  
i h e  R e a l  W u h i .d  6 (1983): “ Econometric models that assume accuracy 
and precision beyond the margins set by reality have no practical useful­
ness (other than as games, teaching aids or as kinds o f finger exercises) 
and bear the same relationship to economics and economic policy as sci­
entific fiction has to science—that is, they may require a good deal
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model o f  Rules x  Facts =  Decision is then mechanically derived 
by the decision maker. The rigid deductive logic follow ed dis­
places the com plex inductive and deductive logic required in legal 
analysis, where the facts determine which rules are relevant, what 
those rules mean, and how they should apply; while the rules 
determine which facts are relevant, what they mean, and how  
they contribute to the consequences that ‘‘ought” to be man­
dated. Inductive logic, the facts o f  the dispute, and insights from  
relevant disciplines play a significant role in determining which 
rules are relevant and in pouring meaning into the rules found  
relevant. Inductive logic and the rules found relevant also play a 
significant role in defining which facts are relevant to the major 
premise and what weight they should have in the minor premise. 
One breaks into this otherwise closed system by understanding 
the moral objectives underlying the area o f  law involved and its 
interrelationship with other areas o f  law and the social sciences, 
the history and experience that caused those values to be captured 
in law by Congress, and the factual and institutional framework 
in which those moral values are given effect.
The analytical process o f  neoclassical thought goes through  
none o f  these steps. It begins with a series o f  abstract and 
unexamined factual and normative assumptions and definitions 
about the affairs o f  the real world. A lthough the language used in 
neoclassical thought has a praiseworthy meaning in popular 
thought, one should be forewarned that the central concepts are 
technical definitions with specific meanings and consequences not
of imagination and pseudo-scientific calculation but are of no help in 
coping with the real world.”
Scientific reasoning, when carried out at its highest and most con­
structive level, must also deal with the difficult process o f determining 
what the facts are, what they mean and how Lhey work in the circum­
stances under investigation in light of the theories found relevant, and 
vice versa. S e e  T. K u h n ,  Thk S t r u c t u r e  o k  S c i e n t i f i c  R e v o l u t i o n s  (2nd 
ed. 1970).” Flynn, Legal Approach to Market Dominance: Assessing 
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, Conference on Current Issues in Tele­
phone Regulation: Dominance and Cost Allocation in Inter exchange 
Markets (Center for Legal and Regulatory Studies, Graduate School of 
Business, The University o f Te>:as, 1987).
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related to the more amorphous and general popular meaning o f  
the terms. Indeed, often the technical meaning o f  a term is used 
interchangeably with other technical meanings, and sometimes is 
even used in its more general popular sense. A central concept o f  
the m odel is the neoclassical concept o f  “ efficiency .”  The neo­
classical concept o f  “ efficicncy” 13 is a narrow and technical 
concept derived from a series o f  assumptions about a model o f  an 
unreal world o f  perfect com petition14 and a tautological definition
13 PDiner defines “efficiency” as “exploiting economic resources in 
such a way that human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer 
willingness to pay for goods and services is maximized.” R. P o s n e r ,  
E c o n o m ic  A n a ly s i s  o k  L a w  4 (1972). The concept is further broken into 
various types of “ efficiency.” Bork maintains there are two types of 
efficiency o f concern—allocative efficiency and productive efficiency: 
“ Allocative efficiency, as used here, refers to the placement of resources 
in the economy, the question of whether resources are employed in tasks 
where consumers value their output most. Productive efficiency refers 
to the effective use o f resources by a particular firm. The idea o f effec­
tive use, as we shall see, encompasses much more than mere technical or 
plant-level efficiency.” R. B ork ,  supra note 2, at 91 (1978).
14 A leading Keynesian, the late Joan Robinson, observed: “ It is 
not legitimate to say: Let us first assume perfect competition, and bring 
in the complications later; for an economy in which textbook-perfect 
competition was possible would be different from our own in important 
respects; we do not know what contradictions we may be letting our­
selves in for by assuming it. Indeed, it usually has to be buttressed by a 
range of further assumptions, such as: the plant is perfectly durable, 
there is no interest on working capital, and so forth. Very drastic 
assumptions are useful to hack out a new path, but it hardly seems 
worthwhile making them in order to stroll up a well-trodden blind 
alley.” J. R o b in s o n , 4  C o l l e c t e d  E c o n o m i c  P a p e r s  134 (1 9 7 3 ) .
This process of simplifying rules for deductive application to facts in 
the name of a scientific approach was called “ mechanical jurispru­
dence’1 by Pound: “ I have referred to mechanical jurisprudence as sci­
entific because those who administer it believe it such. But in truth it is 
not science at all. We no longer hold anything scientific merely because 
it exhibits a rigid scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions. In the 
philosophy o f today, theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas, 
in which we can rest.” Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 C olum . L. 
R e v .  605, 608 (1908).
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o f “ rational” individual and collective conduct.15 It has been 
observed:16
“ [T]he model is premised upon a seemingly innocuous premise, but 
the premise is not empirically or politically verified and is asserted 
without reference to other disciplines which have sLudied human 
behavior.'1 That premise is that individuals are rational maximizers 
of their ends in life and that the observer can tell what people want
15 Law has long suffered from a similar commitment to fixed rules 
and tautological reasoning. Dean Leon Green long ago observed: “ No 
natural or social science has found its secrets in words and phrases and 
neither will the science o f law. There are no such things as words so 
plain that they are not to be interpreted. There are no premises to be 
found so certain that nothing more than an irrefutable logic is required. 
. . .  A process which assumes the very ends it is employed to discover 
will in the end betray its futility. . . . The attempt has been made and is 
still made to make language do the service o f judging itself. There can 
be no such substitution. Words are the machinery by which the power of 
thought is handled, but if there is no such power put into them the 
words are lifeless. In the administration of law, both the judge who sur­
renders this power to phrases as well as the judge who spends his time 
attempting to pattern phrases to control succeeding judges in the cases 
to come, can only do his science ill. . . . There is no warrant for the 
fear that a fluid language and adjustable rules are undependable. We 
have never had any other sort, although we have lost much by not rec­
ognizing that fact. The point is we have looked to the wrong source for 
dependability. We have sought it through a technic o f language instead 
of a technic of judging. We rather trust the machinery than its engi­
neers.” Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28  C o l u m .  L. 
R e v . 1 0 1 4 , 1 0 1 8 -1 9  (1 9 2 8 ) .
16 Legal Reasoning, supra note 3, at 1132.
17 In his review of Posner’s E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s i s  or L a w ,  Arthur Leff 
asked: “ Can one actually, now, write 4 0 0  pages about human desire 
without adverting to Freud, his followers, or even his enemies?” Leff, 
Economic Analysis o f  Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 6 0  V i r ­
g i n i a  L. R e v . 4 5 1 , 4 7 4  (1 9 7 4 ) . Professor Leff made similar observations 
about the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and law 
and how they too arc virtually ignored in establishing first premises in 
neoclassical thought of the type Bork, Easterbrook and Posner advo­
cate.
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and how much they want by observing how much they are willing to 
pay for it."
It has also been suggested that “ law and econom ics advocates 
further claim that econom ists have no concern for the wisdom or 
morality o f choices made by businessmen and consum ers, that 
theirs is but an accounting function o f  toting up the choices 
m ade.” *5 It should be noted that the definition o f  what is 
“ rational”  is circular, since rational is whatever is chosen and 
whatever is chosen is rational—a definition that underlies a 
philosophy o f  extreme utilitarianism and can be made the basis 
for a philosophy o f  radical libertarianism .30 Why the discipline o f
For au exhaustive examination of  file underlying assumption of 
“rationality” in light of several disciplines and empirical studies, see 
Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits o f  Law 
and Economics, 33 U.C.L.A. L. R h v . 1309 (1986). Professor Harrison 
concludes his impressive analysis of the rationality assumption underly­
ing the “ law and economics’’ movement with this observation; “ It has 
become a particularly virulent form of crabgrass that too many measure 
by the ground it covers rather than by any real nurturing it provides. 
Before we abandon the legal field to economics, we had better measure 
more carefully the fertile thought of other disciplines.” Id. at 1363.
The assumption of “rationality” is transferred to "institutions 
Adam Smith never dreamed o f ,” so that corporations and the other 
complex collectives o f  modern life can also be assumed to be acting 
rationally at all times or “ as if”  they were acting rationally. Errors in 
judgment as to how to maximize by individuals or collectives' are pre­
sumably disciplined by the assumed existence of other rational maximiz­
ers operating in an assumed perfectly competitive market. For criticisms 
of the assumptions, see Flynn, The Misuse o f  Economic Analysis in 
Antitrust Litigation, 12 Sw. If.I.. R e v . 335, 348 (1981). See also 
Schwartz, "Justice ” and Other Non-Economic Goals o f  Antitrust, 121 
U. P a .  L, R e v . J076 (1979); Schwartz, Institutional Size and Individual 
Liberty: Authoritarian Aspects o f  Bigness, 55 Nw, U, L. R e v .  4 (1960).
is Legal Reasoning, supra note 3, at 1133.
20 The late Arthur Leff, commenting upon Richard Posner’s 
unquestioned use o f the neoclassical concept o f “rational” in E c o n o m ic  
A n a l y s i s  o f  L a w , observed: “ Thus what people do is good, and its 
goodness can be determined by looking at what it is they do. in place o f  
the more arbitrary normative “goods” of Formalism, and in place of 
the more complicated “goods” of Realism, stands the simple definition-
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econom ics “ ought” to adopt such a circular and m eaning­
less definition o f  rational and measure the choices made only in 
terms o f  what people are willing to pay for their choices is not 
explained by advocates o f  the Chicago School. Speculation about 
the “ ought” underlying these definitions might include a moral 
preference in favor o f  socially unimpeded individual freedom and  
materialism without reference to the complexities o f  how one  
goes about adjusting those values to the apparent need to  have an 
organized society, lest individual freedom  be sacrificed to  
anarchy.21 Or speculation might suggest that we as a society 
ought to revive a 19th-century absolutist view o f  property and
ally circular “ value” of Posner’s book. If human desire itself becomes 
normative (in the sense that it cannot be criticized), and if human desire 
is made definitionally identical with certain human acts, then those 
human acts are also beyond criticism in normative or efficiency terms; 
everyone is doing as best as he can exactly what he set out to do which, 
by definition, is “good” for him. In those terms it is not at all surprising 
that economic analyses have considerable power in predicting how peo­
ple in fact behave.” Leff, supra note 17, at 480.
Such a reasoning process not oniy divorces the analysis from norma­
tive criticism by detaching the model from such concerns, it also affects 
what ought to be considered “ facts” and the legal meaning and signifi­
cance of that which is determined to be a “ fact.” If the only thing that 
counts is giving vent to individual choice without regard for the morality 
of the choices made, then the moral significance of particular choices is 
irrelevant in the utilitarian pursuit of satisfying the greatest good (greed) 
for the greatest number. ■
21 Lon Fuller has observed that in all areas of human action formal 
arrangements in the form of collaborative social arrangements are nec­
essary to make choice effective. Fuller, Freedom—A Suggested Analy­
sis, 68 H a k v .  L. R k v .  1305 (1955). “ [Ilf society seriously left a man 
alone, and thrust none o f its facilities on him, he would starve to 
death.” Fuller, Freedom as a Problem o f  Allocating Choice, 112 P r o c .  
Am. P h i l .  S o c i e t y  101, 103 (1968). It is, o f course, a primary purpose of 
law to order choice in society. At best, it is a tautology to rely on a pol­
icy of unfettered choice to determine the circumstances in which choice 
ought to be fettered. At worst, it is a form of shell game capable of 
entrapping the logically unsophisticated.
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contract rights and the unrealistic view o f  reality that 
accompanied them ,^ despite a modern reality dictating other-
& Both property and contract rights are, of course, creations of 
society and its legal system as part o f the process by which the values o f  
individualism and community are implemented in light of the realities 
con from iry> that society and its underlying moral ideals. As such, it is a 
means to the underlying end of law to reconcile peacefully the compet­
ing demands of individualism and community. See C. M a c p h k k s o n ,  
Property as Means or End, in T h e  R is k  a n d  F a l l  o f  E c o n o m i c  J u s t i c e  
86 (1987); Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell l .Q .  8 (1.927); 
Michelman, Possession v.v. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea o f  
Property, 72 I o w a  L. Rt-v, 1319 (1987). property is not a concept 
describing rights in things, but is a functional concept recognized by a 
legal system and describing the relationship between individuals with 
respect to interests where the legal system will enforce a right to exclude 
others, See Gjerdingen, The Politics o f  the Coase Theorem and Its Rela­
tionship to Modern Legal Thought, 35 B u f f a l o  L. R e v .  871 (1986). 
Similarly, the concept of “contract” is a functional one recognizing a 
relational interest founded on consent where the authority ot' the com­
munity will be brought to bear to enforce a consensual agreement and 
defining the circumstances in which this is the case. See Pound, Liberty 
o f  Contract, 18 Y a l e  L.J. 454 (1909). “ [TJhe law of contract may be 
viewed as a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules accord­
ing to which the sovereign power o f the state will be exercised as 
between the parties to  a more or less voluntary transaction." See also 
Cohen, The Basis o f  Contract, 46 H a k v .  l .  R e v .  553, 586 (1933).
Antitrust policy should be viewed as it originally was in the Addys- 
ton Pipe Si. Steel case, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 
Fed. 271 (6th Cir. I $-98), as part o f the fundamental laws defining the 
svope o f  property and contract rights, rather than as a bothersome limi­
tation upon Lhe unfettered right to invoke the community’s l a w  to exer­
cise such rights, if  this approach were followed, the long-term public 
interest, wealth distribution and bargaining power could not be ignored 
in the determination o f  what contract and property rights ought to be, 
because each would have a significant impact in understanding what can 
take place under the circumstances in accord with the assumptions and 
values underlying property and contract law. Moreover, preexisting 
l e g a l  choices protecting property or contract rights influence current 
legal choices and future ones. See E. Mensch, The History o f Main­
stream Legal Thought, in T h e  P o l i t i c s  o f  L a w ;  A P r o g r e s s i v e  Cm- 
i i q u e :  IS, 37 (D. Kaireys ed. 1982).
(Footnote continues on fo llow ing  page)
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w ise.31 Or it might reflect a choice to favor the political agenda o f  
extreme libertarianism2,1 despite the absencc o f  any debate among 
“ rational maximizers” in the political process as lo  whether that 
type o f  anarchy is the basic political value we wish to rely upon to 
govern econom ic rights and relationships in socicty— if one could  
believe there could be a society guided by such a theory." The 
simple fact is (hat we are never toid what objective is behind the 
adoption o f  a simplistic and circular definition or rationale to 
determine what the law ought to mean. Perhaps the objective is 
to  allow this system o f  analysis lo  have the appearance o f  being a 
closed system o f  analysis like geometry, capablc o f  always pro­
ducing truth and being beyond normative criticism, so long as
(,Footnote continued fro m  previous page)
Some of the advocates of a “ law and economics” approach view 
property Tights as a form of preexisting natural law right enshrined in 
the Constitution. See R, E p s t h i n ,  T a k i n g s :  P r i v a t e  P r o k k k t ^  a n d  t u c  
P o w e r  o f  E m i n e n t  D o m a in  (1985). t his view is debated, strenuously, in 
Symposium on Richard Epstein’s Takings: Private Property and the  
Pow er o f  E m inent Dom ain, 41 LI. M ia m i L. Kev. 1 (1986). The jurispru­
dential assumptions underlying Epstein’s formalism are noted in Radin, 
The Consequences o f  Conceptualism, 41 Mi\ml L. Rv- y . 239 (1986), and 
the political consequences are noted in Sunstein, Two Faces o f  Liberal­
ism , 41 M ia m i  L. Rev. 245 (1986). See also Scanlon, N ozick on Rights. 
Liberty, and  Property, 6 P h i l .  & P u b .  An-a i r s  1 (1976).
See, e.g ., G. G i l m o r k ,  Thk D e a t h  or C o n t r a c t  (1975); P. 
A t i y a i i ,  T h e  R is k  a n d  F a l l  o f  F r e e d o m  or C o n t k a i  i (1979); D a l t o n ,  A n 
Essay in the Deconstruction o f  Contract Doctrine, 94 Y a l k  L..I. 997
(1985); C. M a c p h h r s o n ,  supra n o t e  22; Radin, property and Per- 
sonhood , 34 S i a n .  L. R e v .  957 (1982).
24 See, e.g., McChesney, Law 's H onor Lost: The Pltghi o f  A n ti­
trust, 31 A n t i t r u s t  B l i i l .  359 (1986).
2-' See Fuller, supra  note 21, Freedom as a Problem  o f  Allocating  
Choice; Scanlon, supra note 22. See also the debate between Professor 
West and Judge Posner reflecting different basic assumptions about 
human nature and the consequences of those different assumptions in 
the pages of the Hakvakd Law Review. West, A uthority , A u to n o m y  
and Choice: The Role o f  Consent in the M oraI and Political Visions o f  
Franz K afka  and Richard Posner, 99 Harv, I,. Rkv. 384 (1985); Posner, 
The Ethical Significance o f  t  ree Choice: A Reply to Professor West. 99 
H ah\,  L. Rev. 1431 (1986); Wcsi, Subm ission, Choice and Ethics: A  
Rejoinder to  Judge Posner, 99 Harv, L. K e v .  1449 (1986).
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one does not exam ine its closed system o f reasoning and the 
assumptions upon which the definition o f  rational is based/'"
M oreover, the definition excludes from consideration every­
thing that cannot be materialistically quantified by the measure 
o f  payment the definition permits (willingness to pay), and it 
excludes from consideration the inaction o f  those unable to  
express their choices because they lack the things o f  “ value” (as 
defined by the m odel) to  exchange for the choices they wish to  
m ake.37 Other forms o f efficiencies, like innovation and produc­
tion efficiencies, are ignored by the calculus. For exam ple, no  
attempt is made by Followers o f  this approach in the evaluation  
o f  mergers under the Clayton Act to determine whether a merger, 
particularly a raid financed by junk bonds, is detrimental to  these 
other forms o f  efficiencies. The price paid is all that counts, even 
if  the merger’s sole objective is to maximize the speculative stock  
market pro-fits o f  the raider and part o f  the price paid is realized  
from the assets o f  the firm raided by breaking up and selling o f f  
an ongoing enterprise to pay loans financing the raid. A  hidden  
“ ought”  assum ption is being m ade when the unexplained  
assumption is used to  define and measure the choices observed in  
terms o f  willingness to pay (without regard for the factual 
circumstances, the existing distribution o f  wealth, and the ability  
to  p ayV s That assum ption is that m aterialism and self­
gratification are the only factors motivating human conduct and 
that they are the only factors that the legal system ought to value. 
There is a m ultiplicity o f explanations for human behavior
26 See Leff, supra note 17; Harrison, supra note 18; Kennedy, The 
Role o f  Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism o f  Com~ 
modifies, 34 A m k r i c a n  U.L. Rev. 939 (1985); Rosenberg, supra note 3, 
at 296.
11 See Leff, supra note 17, at 478. See also Dworkin, is Wealth a 
Value?, 9 J, L e g a l  S t u d i e s  191 (1980); Kelnian, Choice and Utility, 
1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769; Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative 
Principle, 9 J. L e g a l  S t u i m e s  227 (1980); Posner, The Value o f  Wealth: 
A Comment on Dwor/cin and Kronman, 9 J. L e g a l  S t u d i e s  243 (1980),
See Kronman, supra note 27; Raker, Starting Points in Economic 
Analysis o f  Law, 8 H o r s T R , \  L. R e v .  939, 940 (1980).
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available from other disciplines that make a considered study o f  
human behavior and m otivation and the consequences o f  curbing 
or not curbing som e forms o f  behavior, instead o f  beginning with 
a tautological definition o f  the problem the proponent o f  this 
form o f  reasoning is called upon to study.”
There is a deeper problem yet with this circular definition o f  
rational and the circular reasoning process it represents,w a 
problem that justifies labeling the econom ic concept o f  rational 
“ pseudo-rational” from a legal viewpoint. “ A  major factor 
influencing any calculus o f  choice is the existing legal system  
governing the society in which the individual is making the 
choices being m easured.” 31 For exam ple, the choice to satisfy
25 See Harrison, supra note 1 8 .  The meaning and implications of
“ rationality” have been continual issues in philosophy ever since the
Stoics and arc issues undergoing extensive and dynamic study in a num­
ber o f disciplines today. See N .  G a r v e r  & P. H a r e  (eds.), N a t u r a l i s m  
a n d  R a t i o n a l i t y  ( 1 9 8 6 ) ;  Slote, Moderation, Rationality and Virtue, 7 
T a n n e r  L e c t u r e s  o n  H u m a n  V a l .u k s  5 3  (S. McMurrin ed. 1 9 8 6 ) .  The
“ law and economics” movement, with its frozen definition of rational­
ity, appears oblivious to developments in the ongoing debate and inves­
tigation of human rationality in other disciplines,
30 Not to mention the static nature of the model and the underlying 
difficulties in dealing with the realities o f power, time, causation and the 
limitations o f language in assessing the reality of what is being investi­
gated. Sec J. H i c k s ,  C a u s a l i t y  in  E c o n o m s c s  (1979); D. M c C l o s k e y ,  
T h e  R h e t o r i c  or E c o n o m i c s  (1985); Curran, Beyond Economic Con­
cepts and Categories: A Democratic Refiguration o f  Antitrust, 3 1  St, 
L o u i s  L.J. 349 (1987); Legal Reasoning, supra note 3, at 1132.
31 Legal Reasoning, supra note 3, at 1134. It has been observed: 
“ The law and economics model is the model of free, value-enhancing 
exchange, yet . . . market exchanges are in fact a function o f the legal 
order; the terms of so-called free bargains (and, taken collectively, the 
supposedly objective market prices) are determined by the legally pro­
tected right to withhold what is owned. Exchange “ value” (and 
“ costs” ) is a function of that right so that the rationale o f exchange is 
ultimately as circular and self-refeTencing as the rationale for legal 
rights. The legitimacy o f every exchange calculus depends upon the 
legitimacy of prior legal decisions; it neither establishes that legitimacy 
nor evades the problem of legitimacy by a purported ahistorical objec­
tivity. . . , The exchange calculus cannot be divorced from the ques-
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on e’s sexual cravings by the act o f rape should take account of  
legal penalties for the act at' rape. Hut if  the underlying definition  
o f  rationality and the method by which it is to be measured are to  
be used to define w hat the law “ ou ght” to proscribe and ought 
not to proscribe, w ithout reference to any normative judgments 
about the choices m ade, one is caught in the circle o f  using the 
definition o f pseudo-rationality to determine one o f  the major 
factors defining the cost o f  making the choice—the legal conse­
quences o f  doing so .52 When deductive logic is then used
tign of distribution, since exchange is a function of the existing distribu­
tion o f iegal entitlement, and every new legal decision (including those 
that rigorously apply the law and economics approach) will inevitably 
affect subsequent distribution and, in turn, affcct subsequent 
exchanges, costs, values, etc.” 13. Mensch, supra note 22. See also 
Samuels, Norm ative Premises in Regulatory Theory. 1 J. P o s t -  
K e y n e s ia n  Econ. 100, 106 {19?&) (“ Wjfh no unique optimal use of 
resources and opportunities independent of rights identification and 
assignment, the lega.1 system must select the result to be pursued: the 
definition o f  the effi den t solution is both the object and the subject o f  
the legal system.").
There are, o f course, numerous empirical objections derived from 
the insights of other disciplines that call into question the reality and 
utility of the definition in real life. See Harrison, supra note 18; Curran, 
supra note 30.
32 Use of Chicago School reasoning assumes the existence of a legal 
system, an existing distribution of wealth entitled to legal protection, 
and the enforcement of the contract and property rights of those with 
power or in the position o f holding the things the model values. 
“ (Mjodern economists assume that someone else, presumably the law- 
Kr.s, has already taken care of the problem of ’externalities’—whether 
costs or benefits—-by providing for their assignment or appropriation by 
the state’s enforcement of particular private property rules. Likewise, 
someone else has already taken care o f the problems o f excluding fraud­
ulent transactions and/or transactions under duress from the universe of 
perfect competitors. . . . The choice to develop conservative back* 
ground ruies was noi one in favor of efficient markets and against egali­
tarian regulation; it was one for a particularly inegalitarian common law 
agenda and against a more egalitarian one. . . . fLJaw plays the same 
apparently minor and clear cm, but in reality major and obscure role in 
neoclassical as in classical economics. As before, it reenforces the status 
quo through an ideological/apologetic message. In classical economics,
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to avoid questioning the well hidden underlying normative 
assumptions being made, it is not difficult to understand how  
som e advocates o f  using the model to determine what the law 
ought to proscribe and to permit can conclude that we as a 
society ought to permit the selling o f  babies,33 ought to permit 
individuals to sell themselves into slavery,31 ought to punish poor  
rapists by criminal sanctions and wealthy ones by tort sanctions,35 
and ought to be concerned only with enforcing the property and 
contract rights o f  those to whom the law gives property and 
contract rights—and consequently bargaining pow er—in assess­
ing the legality o f  the market restraints they im pose.*’ The 
com plexities o f  reality and the difficult intellectual task o f  recon­
ciling conflicting moral views in sorting through the legitimate 
demands o f  individualism and the legitimate demands o f  com m u­
nity within a system o f  divided governmental powers functioning  
under a written constitution all disappear when one bows down  
blindly to the inevitable dictates o f  the model. Unfortunately, a 
society cannot be governed by processes like those governing the 
mindless operations o f  a com puter, condem ned to carry out its
the role of law was to make it plausible that income shares were equiva­
lent to labor inputs, and that unregulated exchange made al! parties bet­
ter off than they could otherwise be. In neoclassical economics the 
notion of a determinate background legal regime of property and con­
tract makes it plausible that we can choose between efficient market and 
egalitarian or equitable regulatory solutions. It doesn’t wash in either 
case.” Kennedy, supra note 26, at 939, 96], 966-67.
w  See R . P o s n e r ,  E c o n o m ic  A n a l y s i s  o f  L a w ,  § 5 . 4  (2d ed. 197 7 ); 
Landes & Posner, The Economics o f  (he Baby Shortage, 7 J, o f  L w . a l  
S t u d i e s  323 (1 9 7 8 ) .
R. P o s n e r ,  T h e  E c o n o m ic s  o f  J u s t i c e  86 (1981); R, P o s n e r  & A. 
K r o n m a n ,  T h e  E c o n o m ic s  o f  C o n t r a c t  L a w  256-60 (1979); West, Sub­
mission, Choice and Ethics: A Rejoinder to  Judge Posner, 99 H a r v .  I .. 
R e v .  1448 (1986).
35 See Flynn, supra note Z.
3(1 Flynn, The "Is” and the “Ought” o f  Vertical Market Restraints 
A fter  Monsanto v. Spray Rite Service Corp., 71 C o r n e l l  L. Rhv. 1095
(1986).
736 : The antitrust bulletin
functions in a reality determined by its fixed logic, predefined  
program, and controlled input.
From this circular definition o f  pseudo-rationality is derived 
the neoclassical definition o f  efficiency, a definition premised 
upon the unstated norm ative assumptions underlying the defin i­
tion o f  rationality: .“ Efficiency is a technical term: it means 
exploiting econom ic resources in such a way that human satisfac­
tion as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for 
good s and services is maximized. Value too is defined by willing­
ness to pay .” r This definition is further subdivided into defin i­
tions for the concepts o f  “ allocative efficiency” and “ productive 
efficiency.”  Judge Bork has defined them as follows: “ Allocative 
efficiency, as used here, refers to the placement o f  resources in 
the econom y, the question o f  whether resources are em ployed in 
tasks where consumers value their input most. Productive e ffi­
ciency refers to the effective use o f  resources by particular 
firm s.” 5S And, Bork asserts, “ The whole task o f  antitrust can be 
summed up as the effort to improve aiiocative efficiency without 
impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no  
gain or a net loss in  consumer w elfare,” ” W hile the distinction  
may be useful for ahstract theorizing, and the values represented 
by these technical definitions o f  efficiency are worthy o f consid­
eration, the distinction falls to pieces when confronted with the 
com plexities o f  reality and the normative question underlying all 
antitrust litigation: what ought to be the scope o f  the state- 
created property and contract rights o f  the proponent o f  the 
restraint in light o f  ihe social, political and econom ic normative 
goals for antitrust policy set forth by the lawgiver (Congress)? 
The m ethodology o f  logical positivism causes one to answer this 
question by ignoring it in one’s major premise and by ignoring 
the reality o f the dispute being analyzed. Although logical, it is 
hardly a rational form o f  decision making. It is a simplistic form
11 K, P o sn e k , supra note 13. See generally Symposium on Effi­
ciency as a  Legal Concern, 8 H o k s t r a  L. R ev . 485 (1980) fo r  an exami­
nation o f some o f  the complexities of th e  concept.
38 R . B o r k ,  supra n o te  2 , a t  91 .
B o rk , ibid.
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o f  deductive reasoning reaffirm ing  the theological postu la tes 
underly ing  the m odel w ithout regard  fo r the reality  under investi­
gation  o r the m oral ends o f  the law in question  and  the m o ra l 
consequences those  ends d ictate.
M oving up the inverted  pyram id o f  tightly  in terw oven d efin i­
tions and  assum ptions,40 “ consum er w e lfa re ,”  in tu rn , as defined  
by neoclassical price theory,*' m eans “ behavior w hose net effect
40 The image of “ economic analysis” being an inverted pyramid, 
with its point based on unrealistic definitions and the quicksand of 
unproven and sometimes false assumptions of fact, is made more 
graphic in light of the central question addressed by Professor Harrison, 
supra note 18, at 1362: “ Can the underlying assumptions of economics 
support the huge normative weight that the discipline is asked to bear in 
its application to law?” Harrison’s exhaustive study indicates that the 
answer is clearly “ N o.”
By overstating the relevance of economic analysis to reality and law, 
the proponents o f the movement run the serious risk that a rejection of 
the model and its deductive use in law will result in a rejection of the 
exclusive value underlying the model—individual human freedom and 
the narrow efficiency value it purports to foster. Just as the excessive 
use o f the model in legal analysis has resulted in ignoring other values 
relevant to the determination of what the facts and rules “ ought” to  be 
for purposes of the analysis of a field of law like antitrust policy, adop­
tion o f a counter-model or the return to an excessively loose legal real­
ism in rejecting the law and economics model runs the risk o f ignoring 
or undervaluing the norm of individual human freedom, the a l l o c a t i v e  
efficiency value, and the insights of empirically based economic analy­
sis. The task confronting antitrust policy is to  come up with reasonably 
stable standards and a methodology for analysis capable of accounting 
for all the values that “ ought” to be considered, all the facts relevant to 
an evaluation of those values, and all the institutional constraints upon 
the context in which the antitrust laws are implemented.
41 Itself a rather complex series o f two-dimensional assumptions 
(supply and demand measured once again on the assumption o f value 
defined and measured solely by willingness to  pay) bottomed on the 
rationality and efficicncy assumptions. The conditions for its existence 
(perfect competition) are so unrealistic as to call into question any use of 
the model in the intensely pragmatic world of the legal analysis of actual 
disputes, let alone in economic theorizing. See Flynn, supra note 18; 
Rowe, The Decline o f  Antitrust and the Delusion o f  Models: The Faust­
ian Pact o f  Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J. 1511 (1984); Wright, 
Some Pitfalls o f  Economic Theory as a Guide to the Law o f Competi­
tion, 37 Va. L. Rev. 1083 (1951).
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is o u tp u t restric ting and hence d e trim en ta l” — detrim en tal in 
term s o f  the n o rm ativ e  and  fac tu a l assum ptions underly ing  neo­
classical price th e o ry  and  in  light o f  the stric t deductive logic 
em ployed by the theory to determine  which values will b e  p e rm it­
ted  to  he considered a n d  which facts a re  " fa c ts ”  fo r purposes o f 
the analysis. •
T he analysis is a ttrac tiv e  because o f  its underly ing and  exclu­
sive concern  w ith m axim izing hum an freedom  and  its em phasis 
u p o n  the value o f  a llocative e f f i c i e n c y ." T h e  analysis is a lio  
seductive, not the least fo r its clever use o f  language w ith a 
laudable po p u lar m ean ing  ( “ ra tio n a l,”  “ effic ien cy ,’' “ consum er 
w e lfa re” ) to  describe what a re  norm arively loaded an d  technical 
concepts which can  o n ly  be u nderstood  in  light o f  the tau to logical 
defin itions and  h id d en  norm ative assum ptions underly ing  the  
m o d e l.” 43 T he ana lysis is also  seductive because o f its rigid use o f 
deductive logic and th e  self-proclaim ed au ra  o f  being a  science in 
the sense o f  a  system  o f  tho u g h t capable o f  p ro d u c in g  objective 
tru th  w ithou t reference to  o ther disciplines, requirem ents o f  the 
legal process like th e  division o f  judge and  ju ry  functions, the  
m ora l goals o f  the law  involved, and  the norm ative consequences 
o f  the choices m ade. F u rth er, “ the analysis taps in to  the sim plis­
tic fear o f  d iscretion afflic ting  logical positivists by claim ing th a t 
re liance up o n  the m odel in  the legal analysis o f  an titru s t d isputes 
ends the risk o f  the ir ra tio n a li ty ’ o f  d iscre tio n .” *4 D iscretion  is
42 “ For ail his claims to nmi-normativity, it is obvious that there is 
a t least one value qua  value ihat dir eels and informs Posner’s whole 
analysis. God (and history) knows it’s one that docs him credit: individ­
ual human freedom. . . .  As uormatives go, freedom is a good, and 
there’s no reason for anyone to be embarrassed by its espousal.”  Leff, 
supra note 17, at 477. What is embarrassing is the advocacy o f the value 
to  the exclusion o f  all other values and reality, except perhaps in a 
revival meeting of extreme libertarians.
43 Legal Reasoning, supra note 3, at 11.15.
1,4 Ibid. Judge Bork is perhaps the clearest and most sophisticated 
exponent of the necessity (value) o f courts following a positivists 
approach in antitrust analysis, although he does not address the trou­
bling jurisprudential question of whether it is possible. “ The need of the
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considered  irra tiona l, ra ther th an  inescapable, because discretion 
underm ines a know ablc analytical fram ew ork  to  co n tro l the  
a rb itra ry  exercise o f  jud icial pow er that w ould otherw ise im pinge 
up o n  the unsta ted  norm ative libertarian  ideological values o f  
ab so lu te  p ro p e rty  and  contract rights or up o n  the u tilita r ian  
objective o f  m axim izing short-term  m ajority  desires and  p ro v id ­
ing the point u p o n  which 1 he entire inverted  pyram id  rests. F rom  
the view point o f  deveJoping a sensible role fo r an titru st policy in 
defin ing  the scope o f  legally enforceable p roperty  and  co n trac t 
righ ts in  light o f  con tem porary  reality  and  h istorical experience, 
th e  goals o f  an titru st policy and  constra in ts u p o n  th e  legal 
process, reliance upon the m echanical and deductive app lication  
o f  the m odel results in the abo lition  o f  the an titru st law s.4; F rom
law generally is for the systematic development of normative models of 
judicial behavior, models which, while they cannot attain, will at least 
distantly approach the rigor o f the descriptive models o f basic economic 
theory. Until we have such models, criticism of the courts for having the 
wrong goals will generally be empty, the mere assertion of a different set 
of personal preferences. Thai is a deplorable condition, since it means 
that we lack valid, objective standards for evaluating and controlling 
judicial performance. In such circumstance, we cannot attain a “ rule of 
law .” . . . Whether one looks at the texts of the antitrust statutes, the 
legislative intent behind them, or the requirements of proper judicial 
behavior, therefore, the ease is overwhelming for judicial adherence lo 
the single goal of consumer welfare in the interpretation of the antitrust 
laws. Only that goal is consistent with congressional intent, and, equally 
important, only that goal permits courts to behave responsibly and to 
achieve the virtues appropriate to law. . . . There is no body of knowl­
edge other than conventional priee theory that can serve as a guide to 
the effects of business behavior upon consumer welfare [as defined by 
the model]. To abandon economic theory is to abandon the possibility 
of a rational antitrust law.” R, Bokk, supra note 2, at 72, 89, 117.
In commenting on a similar philosophy of positivism underlying 
Posner’s E c o n o m i c  A n a l y s i s  o f  L a w . Arihuj Leff observed: ‘‘All you 
have ended up doing is substituting for the arbitrariness of ethics the 
impossibilities of epistemology.” Leff, supra note 17, at 456.
45 Dewey, book review: Antitrust and Economic Theory: An 
Uneasy Friendship (review o f  R .  B o r k ,  Tub A n t i t r u s t  P a r a d o x :  A  P o l ­
i c y  a t  W a r  W i t h  I t s k l k ) ,  87 Y a l e  L.J. 1516, 1518 (1978): “ The truth is 
that a rigorous and consistent application to the issues of antitrust of a 
price theory that ignores externalities and assumes free entry and exit of
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the view point o f  m odern  ju risp rudence and a  reflective and 
em pirically  based discipline o f  econom ics, this covert reb irth  o f 
rigid positiv ism 46 is as startling  as it is intellectually indefensib le . ^  
F rom  the view point o f  the com plex na tu re  o f  legal reason ing , 
reliance u p o n  this m ethodology o f  naive positivism  in th e  acad ­
em y and by the courts in  this day and age is inexplicab le.“ F rom
firms can have only one result: the demonstration (hat any interference 
with freedom o f contract will reduce consumer welfare.”  See also 
Flynn, supra note 2.
4fi See Posner. Some Uses and Abuses o f  Economics in Lav/, 46 U. 
C h i . L .  R e v . 281, 2 8 5  (1 9 7 9 )  (describing his form o f economic analysis 
o f law as a methodology for describing what “ is” as opposed to  a nor­
mative approach attempting to define what law “ ought” to  be). In legal 
analysis, the “ is" cannot be divorced from the “ ought." See Flynn, 
supra note 36.
47 See Baker, supra note 28; Harrison, supra note 18; Leff, supra 
note 17; Kelman, Misunderstanding Social Life: A Critique o f  the Core 
Premises o f  “Law and Economics' \  33 J. L e g a l  E d u c a t i o n  274 (1983); 
Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses o f  Economics in 
Law , 46 U. Cm. L. R e v . 307 (1979); Miller, Economic Analysis o f  Legal 
Method and Law: The Danger in Valueless Values, 21 G o n z a g a  I . R e v . 
425 (1986). See also Burton, Comment1 on “Empty Ideas”: Logical Pos­
itivist Analyses o f Equality and Rules, 91 Y a l e  L.J. 1136, 1140-47
(1982); Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 C a l i f . 1.. R e v , 
138 (1984).
43 A similar development took place in the last century with regard 
to decisions interpreting the Commerce Clause and the invention of 
“ substantive due process” by judges committed to the ideology o f lais- 
sezfaire. Pound described that period as follows, a description equally 
applicable to many judicial opinions today: “ |W]hen in the last quarter 
o f the nineteenth century our courts were called upon with increasing 
frequency to pass on the validity of social legislation, in the transition 
from pioneer, rural, agricultural America to the urban, industrialized 
America of today, they turned to an idealized picture o f the economic 
order with which they were familiar, the principles o f which had been 
set forth by the classical political economists. They pictured an ideal 
society in which there was a maximum of abstract individual self­
assertion, This was “ liberty” as secured in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Hence all limitations upon abstract free self-assertion were presumably 
arbitrary. Such legislation sought vainly to turn back the current o f legal 
progress in its steady flow from status to contract, and hence was not
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th e  view point o f  fa ith fu lly  enforcing  the laws th a t governm ent 
o ffic ia ls have sw orn to  u pho ld  and  defend , reliance up o n  this 
m ethodo logy  o f  logical positivism  and th e  values underly ing  the 
m odel results in a denial o f  their oa th  o f  office.
C o n c lu s io n
T w o conclusions should not be d raw n  from  all th a t I have 
said  and  all th a t could be said ab o u t th e  present exclusive reliance 
u p o n  neoclassical econom ic theorizing in  legal analysis in  general 
and  in  th e  enforcem ent and  in terp re ta tio n  o f  the an titru st laws in 
p articu la r. T he first incorrect conclusion w ould be th a t  I am  
suggesting there is no  ro le  fo r insights from  the social sciences— 
particu la rly  econom ics—in legal analysis generally and  in  an ti­
tru s t analysis in  p articu la r. B oth  the m eaning and  app lica tion  o f 
law  and  o u r u nderstand ing  o f  reality  are dependent up o n  insights 
from  o th er disciplines, as is an  app recia tion  fo r the subtleties o f 
legal reason ing  and  th e  m ora l ob ligations o f  law . T here is a 
d esp era te  need  fo r creative and  construc tive  social science 
research  aw are o f  its ow n assum ptions and th e  norm ative values 
underly ing  the law  and  the in stitu tional constra in ts up o n  the 
law ’s adm in istra tion . The values o f  allocative, p roductive and  
innovative efficiencies are clearly concerns o f  relevance to  the  
ad m in is tra tio n  and  in terp re ta tio n  o f th e  an titru st laws. They arc, 
how ever, facto rs th a t m ust be evaluated in  the light o f  h isto ry , 
experience, m odern  realities, the realities o f  particu la r cases and 
th e  com plex o f  o th e r norm ative goals C ongress has m andated  fo r 
th e  an titru s t laws. In the an titru st field we need to  study the 
im pact o f  in stitu tional size up o n  indiv iduality , invention  and  
creativity; th e  im pact o f exalting ind ividual greed u p o n  th e  long­
due process of law. With such a picture o f the social order and the end 
of the law before it as the basis of its conclusion, more than one court 
disclaimed against legislation forbidding the payment of wages in orders 
on a company store as subversive of the abstract liberty of the work­
man, reducing him to the position of the infant, the lunatic, and the 
felon, and arbitrarily setting up a status of laborer in a world which had 
moved to a regime of contract.” Pound, The Theory o f  Judicial Deci­
sion, 36 H a r v . L ,  R e v . 641, 653*54 (1923).
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term  interests o f com m unity ; the effect n f  m ergers on  local 
com m unities, the labo r force, econom ic co n cen tra tio n , political 
and  social liberty  and  the long-term  evolution o f  specific in d u s­
tries; case studies on  the effects o f pricing practices w ithin the 
con tex t o f  specific industries; studies o f th e  effcct o f  specific 
industry  structu re  on  pricing, innovation  and  political pow er; the 
em ergence o f  an in terdependen t w orld econom y; m o tiv a tio n a l 
studies o f  m anagem ent and the behavior o f  firm s from  o th er 
nations; and on and  on . W hat we do not need are fu rth e r 
ideological tracts detached from  reality  and the C ongressional 
goals fo r an titru st policy; trac ts  useful only fo r confirm ing  the 
m ora l and political presuppositions o f  the theologians w riting the  
t ra c t .
The second conclusion th a t should not be draw n from  w hat 1 
have said is th a t law and  the legal analysis n f an titru s t policy are 
an  open-ended and m eaningless excrcise destined to  reflect the  
whim  of th e  person m aking the analysis. T here are boundaries to 
the scope o f  the law ’s relevance, m eaning and app lica tion  in the 
in terp re ta tio n  and enforcem ent o f  the an titru s t laws. T hey  are  to  
be found  in the language used in the law , its h istory , th e  facts to  
which it is expected to  be applied , the role defin itions o f  those 
expected to  apply it, a n d —m ost im portan tly— the underly ing 
norm ative values (including but not lim ited to  econom ic values) 
th a t the law is expected to  foster and  im plem ent. E lsew here I 
have identified  a know able and w orkable fram ew ork  fo r the 
analysis o f an titru st policy and  disputes."" It is one th a t relies 
u p o n  the insights o f  a num ber o f  the social sciences— including a 
m ore reflective and  skeptical form  o f  econom ic ana lysis—one not 
ensnared  in the trap  o f  tau to logical and  m eaningless defin itions 
and  unrealistic and  unexam ined m oral and  factual assum ptions. 
It is one that relies upon  devices o f  legal analysis like evidentiary  
p resum ptions and shifting burdens o f  pi o o f to  enable the analysis 
to  tak e  account o f  the reality un ique to  the d ispute under
49 See generally Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section I A na lysis: 
Three Proposals fo r  Reducing the Chaos, 49 A n t i t k u s i  L.J, 1593
(1980); Flynn, Monopolization Under the Sherman Act: The Third 
Wuve and Beyond, 26 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l . 1 (J981); Legal Reasoning, 
supra note 3; Flynn, supra notes 35 & 36.
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investigation , while also  blending skillfully the com plex o f  n o r­
m ative  goals underly ing the law and unavoidably  im pacted  by the 
controversy . A nd it is one capable o f  tak ing  account o f the social, 
po litica l and  econom ic goals o f  an titru st policy— the goals C o n ­
gress m an d ated  an titru s t policy account for in [he adm in istra tion  
an d  enforcem ent o f the law.
Som e o f  the p roponen ts o f  an exclusive reliance upon neoclas­
sical theo ry  to  d ictate  an titru st policy w ould undoub ted ly  ch a rac­
terize w hat I advocate as a fo rm  o f  poetry ; poetry  in the sense o f 
sen tim ental or m eaningless guidelines incapable o f surviving a n a ­
lytical rigor o r o f  providing consistent app lica tion . Every legal 
decision , how ever, is unavo idab ly  a m oral decision; an " o u g h t” 
d e term in a tio n  in light o f o u r understand ing  o f  the " i s ” — and  vice 
versa. For those o f  us o f  Irish descent and concerned w ith the 
n a tu re  o f  legal reasoning and  the underly ing m ora l con ten t o f  law 
and  related  disciplines like econom ics, it is a fine com plim ent to  
label as poelry  w hat we un d erstan d  intellectual inqu iry  to  be—the 
exp lo ra tion  o f  th e  “ g o o d ”  behind th e  shadow s in P la to ’s cave 
an d  th e  sun th a t creates them , if you like. F o r us, poetry is tru th  
dw elling in beauty .
